I' having a little 'technical' #problem while #adding #users to a @group on a #Lubuntu #server. Here's the puzzling thing (to me): mc@Lubuntu1:~$ groups mc adm cdrom sudo dip plugdev lpadmin sambashare shared mc@Lubuntu1:~$ groups mc mc : mc adm cdrom sudo dip plugdev lpadmin sambashare shared common See the difference? I cannot understand why the group "common" does not appear with the first command. Perhaps someone more experienced than me with linux/ubuntu knows why this is happening? Thanks in advance for any help.
Bonjour à tous, peertube.ch vient d'ouvrir la possibilité de créer son compte. De façon temporaire le quota est de 0gb, cependant vous pouvez payer pour avoir de l'espace disque supplémentaire. Les prix sont les suivants par mois : Tout l'espace disque proposé est en SSD
With the launch of WorkDrive, Zoho is aiming to bridge its apps with a unified search, single storage repository and integration with encryption, virus detection, imaging processing and artificial intelligence.
The Active Management Technology ( #AMT ) application, part of the Intel “vPro” brand, is a #Web server and application code that enables #remote #users to #power on, power off, view information about, and otherwise manage the #PC. It can be used remotely even while the PC is powered off ( via #Wake-on-Lan ). Traffic is encrypted using #SSL / #TLS libraries, but recall that all of the major SSL/TLS implementations have had highly publicized vulnerabilities. The AMT application itself has known #vulnerabilities, which have been #exploited to develop #rootkits and #keyloggers and #covertly gain #encrypted #access to the management features of a PC. Remember that the ME has full access to the PC’s RAM. This means that an #attacker exploiting any of these vulnerabilities may gain access to everything on the PC as it runs: all open #files, all running #applications, all #keys pressed, and more.
ME firmware versions 4.0 and later (Intel 4 Series and later chipsets) include an ME application for audio and video DRM called “Protected Audio Video Path” (PAVP). The ME receives from the #host operating system an encrypted #media #stream and encrypted key, decrypts the key, and sends the encrypted media decrypted key to the #GPU, which then #decrypts the media. PAVP is also used by another ME application to draw an #authentication PIN pad directly onto the screen. In this usage, the PAVP application directly controls the graphics that appear on the PC’s screen in a way that the host #OS cannot detect. ME firmware version 7.0 on PCHs with 2nd Generation Intel Core #i3 / #i5 / #i7 (Sandy Bridge) CPUs replaces PAVP with a similar DRM application called “Intel Insider”. Like the AMT application, these DRM applications, which in themselves are defective by design, demonstrate the #omnipotent #capabilities of the ME: this #hardware and its proprietary firmware can access and #control everything that is in RAM and even everything that is shown on the #screen.
The Intel Management Engine with its #proprietary firmware has complete access to and control over the PC: it can power on or shut down the PC, read all open files, examine all running applications, track all keys pressed and #mouse movements, and even #capture or #display #images on the screen. And it has a network interface that is demonstrably #insecure, which can allow an attacker on the network to #inject #rootkits that completely compromise the PC and can report to the attacker all activities performed on the PC. It is a #threat to #freedom, #security, and #privacy that can’t be ignored.
Before version 6.0 (that is, on systems from 2008/2009 and earlier), the ME can be disabled by setting a couple of values in the SPI flash memory. The ME firmware can then be #removed entirely from the flash memory space. Libreboot does this on the Intel 4 Series systems that it supports, such as the Libreboot X200 and Libreboot T400. ME firmware versions 6.0 and later, which are found on all systems with an Intel #Core i3/i5/i7 CPU and a PCH, include “ME Ignition” firmware that performs some hardware #initialization and power management. If the ME’s boot ROM does not find in the SPI flash memory an ME firmware manifest with a valid Intel signature, the whole PC will shut down after 30 minutes.
Due to the signature verification, developing free #replacement firmware for the ME is basically impossible. The only entity capable of replacing the ME firmware is Intel. As previously stated, the ME firmware includes proprietary code licensed from third parties, so Intel couldn’t release the source code even if they wanted to. And even if they developed completely new ME firmware without third-party proprietary code and released its source code, the ME’s boot ROM would reject any modified firmware that isn’t signed by Intel. Thus, the ME firmware is both hopelessly proprietary and #tivoized.
Even when Intel does cooperate, they still don’t provide source code. They might provide limited #information (datasheets) under #strict #corporate #NDA ( #non-disclosure #agreement ), but even that is not guaranteed. Even ODMs and IBVs can’t get source code from Intel, in most cases (they will just integrate the blobs that Intel provides).
In summary, the Intel #Management #Engine and its applications are a #backdoor with #total access to and control over the rest of the PC. The ME is a threat to freedom, security, and privacy, and the Libreboot project strongly recommends avoiding it entirely. Since recent versions of it can’t be removed, this means avoiding all #recent #generations of Intel hardware.
Recent Intel graphics chipsets also require firmware blobs
Intel is only going to get #worse when it comes to user freedom. Libreboot has no support recent Intel platforms, precisely because of the problems described above. The only way to solve this is to get Intel to #change their #policies and to be more #friendly to the free software #community. Reverse engineering won’t solve anything long-term, unfortunately, but we need to keep doing it anyway. Moving forward, Intel hardware is a non-option unless a #radical change happens within Intel.
Basically, all Intel hardware from year 2010 and beyond will never be supported by Libreboot. The Libreboot project is actively #ignoring all modern Intel hardware at this point, and focusing on #alternative platforms.
Why is the latest AMD hardware unsupported in Libreboot?
It is extremely unlikely that any post-2013 #AMD hardware will ever be supported in Libreboot, due to severe security and freedom #issues; so #severe, that the Libreboot project recommends avoiding all modern AMD hardware. If you have an AMD based system affected by the #problems described below, then you should get rid of it as soon as possible.
AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP)
This is basically AMD’s own version of the Intel Management Engine. It has all of the same basic security and freedom issues, although the #implementation is wildly different.
The Platform Security Processor (PSP) is built in on all Family 16h + systems (basically anything post-2013), and controls the main #x86 core #startup. PSP firmware is cryptographically signed with a strong key similar to the Intel ME. If the PSP firmware is not present, or if the AMD signing key is not present, the #x86 cores will not be #released from #reset, rendering the system #inoperable.
The PSP is an ARM core with TrustZone #technology, built onto the main CPU die. As such, it has the ability to #hide its own program code, scratch RAM, and any data it may have taken and stored from the lesser-privileged x86 system RAM (kernel encryption keys, #login data, #browsing #history, #keystrokes, who knows!). To make matters worse, the PSP theoretically has access to the entire system memory space (AMD either will not or cannot deny this, and it would seem to be required to allow the DRM “features” to work as intended), which means that it has at minimum MMIO-based access to the #network controllers and any other PCI/PCIe peripherals installed on the #system.
In theory any #malicious entity with access to the AMD signing key would be able to install persistent #malware that could not be eradicated without an external flasher and a known good PSP image. Furthermore, multiple security vulnerabilities have been demonstrated in AMD #firmware in the #past, and there is every #reason to assume one or more zero day vulnerabilities are lurking in the PSP firmware. Given the extreme privilege level (ring -2 or ring -3) of the PSP, said vulnerabilities would have the ability to #remotely #monitor and control any PSP enabled machine completely outside of the user’s #knowledge.
A reliable way to avoid Intel and AMD’s universal backdoors is to use computers with such spyware effectively removed or disabled like the ones certified to Respect Your Freedom (RYF).
Julien is an independent developer who built and maintains one of the most popular audio apps in the Google Play store. With millions of downloads and hundreds of thousands of positive reviews, he’s obsessive about responding to user complaints and concerns.
He often receives emails from users complaining that his app is draining their battery and using more data than expected. Usually, it’s because they set the app to download files when they’re not on Wi-Fi. But sometimes it’s due to ad fraudsters taking advantage of his app to run hidden, data-hungry video ads behind the legitimate banners he sells to earn his living.
Julienʼs app is one of several, including many using Twitterʼs MoPub ad platform, that saw its in-app ads hijacked in an ad fraud scheme uncovered by fraud detection firm Protected Media. The company’s findings, along with additional reporting and interviews by BuzzFeed News, and independent verification from an outside ad fraud lab, show that one of the players implicated in this scheme is Aniview, an Israeli company with offices in New York that runs a video ad technology platform.
Aniview denies any involvement and instead says the platform and banner ads and code, which were created by one of its subsidiaries, were exploited by a malicious, unnamed third party.
“BuzzFeed brought to our attention that there is an abuse activity, as an immediate action, we stopped this activity and started and continue an internal incident review,” said Aniview CEO Alon Carmel in an emailed statement. “We notified and emphasized our clients that the use of our platform must be according to our policy and the IAB and TAG guidelines.”
It’s just one of the many ways ad fraudsters siphon money out of the global digital advertising industry, which will see more than $20 billion stolen this year. This scheme in particular highlights once again how ad tech companies exploit insider access and technical knowledge to participate in ad fraud.
“I don’t even think about me being ripped off,” Julien told BuzzFeed News. “All I think about is them damaging the app’s reputation. It can cost money to [a user] and drain his battery. This is the thing that makes me really mad.” (BuzzFeed News agreed to withhold his full name and the name of his app due to concerns about people wrongly thinking it was knowingly part of the scheme.)
Here’s how the scheme works. Julien sells a banner ad, which appears in the app and is visible to his users. Then, hidden from view behind that banner, fraudsters conceal autoplaying video ads that no human being actually sees, but which register as having been served and viewed. In this scenario, Julien gets paid for the small banner ad in his app that users see, but the fraudsters earn many times that amount by stuffing far more lucrative video ads behind the banner. Ultimately, it’s the brands whose ads were shown in hidden video players that lose money to those running the scheme.
“Fraudsters are purchasing cheap in-app display inventory and are filling it with multiple video players behind innocuous fake branded display ads,” said Asaf Greiner, the CEO of Protected Media.
This type of ad fraud is known in the industry as in-banner video ads, and has been documented in the past. Greiner’s team identified a new version of it last fall and said in total they’ve seen tens of millions of dollarsʼ worth of fraudulent video ads running per month as a result.
The ad fraud lab run by DoubleVerify, a digital measurement company, identified the same in-banner video ad fraud scheme at the end of last year, according to Roy Rosenfeld, the company’s VP of product management.
He told BuzzFeed News the fraudsters “did a very good job at hiding and obfuscating what they were doing” and were “quite sophisticated in the thinking behind how they can monetize that [video]inventory.”
DoubleVerify saw at least 60 million ad calls being made for fraudulent video ads per month, though Rosenfeld noted that not all of those ad slots were filled.
Aniview and its subsidiary, OutStream Media, were identified by Protected Media as being part of the scheme after the fraud detection firm gathered and analyzed video evidence, code, and other information during an investigation.
Rosenfeld said DoubleVerify’s investigation identified that “the Aniview player was heavily driving” the fraudulent video ad activity. He said his team identified the same code and other materials as Protected Media had.
Carmel, of Aniview, told BuzzFeed News that his company “does not knowingly engage in any fraudulent activity” and said his team has been trying to stop this activity on their platform since they were first contact by Protected Media last month. He acknowledged that OutStream Media, the company identified by Protected Media, is a subsidiary of Aniview. But he said it had ceased operations last summer and that Aniview is in the process of legally shutting it down. He said the ad fraud documented by Protected Media and DoubleVerify was done by bad actors using the Aniview video ad platform, as well as images and code created by OutStream Media, in an unauthorized way.
“To be crystal clear, another customer on Aniview’s [self-serve] platform used this [video ad] player and is responsible for this activity and we took actions immediately to stop this activity,” he said.
“We are fighting against bad activities, pushing and focus on clean and legit activities and should not be blamed or framed for bad use of our platform."
Carmel could not say who this bad actor was or how they managed to gain access to content that was uploaded to an OutStream Media account on Aniview’s platform. He declined to identify the malicious actors, or to share any details about them. He also acknowledged removing the photos and names of people, including his cofounder, Tal Melenboim, from Aniview’s website after being contacted by BuzzFeed News.
Two of the removed employees had leadership roles with OutStream Media in addition to their work at Aniview. Carmel, who previously cofounded the popular Jewish dating site Jdate, said they left the company to pursue other interests at the end of last year, and he neglected to remove them from the Aniview team page.
Carmel was provided with a copy of the malicious code used to place the banner ads and hidden video players. In addition to using the Aniview platform and banner ads from OutStream Media’s account on it, this code included the URL shoval.tv as a tracking pixel to gather data on ad performance. Shoval.tv is a domain name owned by Aniview cofounder Tal Melenboim. In an email to BuzzFeed News, Melenboim denied any involvement.
Carmel said the fraudsters must have copied the part of the code that included Shoval.tv from an earlier OutStream demo, and said Shoval.tv is commonly used as a tracking URL by Aniview. The inclusion of this code means that only a person with access to shoval.tv would be able to track the performance of the fraudulent ads carrying this pixel.
Protected Media also found that a significant portion of the banner ads purchased for this scheme were bought using MoPub, the mobile ad network owned by Twitter. This does not mean MoPub was engaged in the scheme. But it does mean Twitter’s ad platform was exploited for months by fraudsters, and it earned commission on the ads bought using its tools. (Julien uses MoPub to help place ads in his app and says the company is responsive when he reports bad ads.)
“At this time, we can confirm that the suspicious activity in question is not being initiated by MoPub,” a company spokesperson told BuzzFeed News. “The activity observed by Protected Media stems from an ad that is initiating other non-viewable video ads to run in the background. We are currently investigating what the potential sources of the issue could be.”
This scheme illustrates one of the central challenges in reducing the massive, multibillion-dollar fraud problem in digital advertising: Nearly every player in the supply chain, except for the brands who spend money on ads, profits from fraudulent ad delivery. Even if they’re not involved in ad fraud, platforms such as ad networks and other intermediaries earn a share of the money spent on invalid ads. This creates a disincentive to stop fraud from taking place, according to Greiner.
“It’s an unfair kind of situation because anybody who behaves well and doesn’t allow this on their platform is being left out of the profit,” he said, adding that “there’s very little penalty and there’s a lot to gain — the numbers are just enormous.”
Protected Media first detected the use of hidden video ads in October. Though not a new ad fraud technique, the company saw this iteration grow large enough that it warranted a closer look. After seeing which video players were being used to run the hidden ads, and which ad networks the fraudsters were buying the display ad from, Protected Media reached out to the relevant parties, including Aniview, last month. (Rosenfeld of DoubleVerify said it also identified the scheme late last year and began blocking it.)
Protected Media provided BuzzFeed News with video documentation of invalid video ads running behind banners that were created by OutStream Media, Aniview’s subsidiary. These video ads were served using Aniview’s platform and the banner ads were hosted on Aniview’s website with an account in OutStream Media’s name. This demonstrates a direct link between OutStream Media and the banners that were placed in apps such as Julien’s.
Protected Media also identified that the shoval.tv domain name owned by Aniview cofounder Tal Melenboim was used to track the performance of the fraudulent ads, adding yet another link to Aniview.
Given that information, Greiner believes “Aniview is the group who left no room for deniability — the others can claim ignorance.”
After BuzzFeed News first contacted Aniview, the company removed the LinkedIn page for OutStream Media, and deleted people from the Aniview team page on its website. Two of the removed people were Melenboim, who had previously listed himself as the founder and CEO of OutStream Media on his LinkedIn, and his wife Mazal Melenboim, whose LinkedIn lists her as the head of media operations for Aniview and the head of operations for OutStream Media.
Carmel said the couple left Aniview at the end of last year and praised Tal Melenboim as a “reputable professional” who was “an asset to Aniview during his many years of employment.”
Tal Melenboim told BuzzFeed News in an email that he and his wife are not involved in any illegal activity. “It is important for me to point out to you, that if you got the impression that Aniview/Outstream Media or someone from our team, including me or my wife, is involved in an act of not legit activity, it is simply far away from the true.” (Melenboim said that Carmel’s English is better than his, and that as a result specific questions should be directed to him.)
Carmel said the Melenboims were removed from the company website at his direction after being contacted by BuzzFeed News, and said it was an oversight that they were still on the site. He offered to provide a letter from the company’s legal counsel to testify to the fact that the Melenboims had not worked at Aniview since the end of last year. He also said other employees were removed from the company’s team page at the same time.
After BuzzFeed News emailed Carmel two links that showed the scheme was still active on his platform, the activity was quickly shut off. He said that was a result of his company being given the information necessary to shut it down.
One of the links BuzzFeed News provided to Carmel went to a page at play.aniview.com/outstreammedia/ that hosted the banner ads used in the scheme. These banners were generic images for companies and products such as Coca-Cola, M&Mʼs, McDonald’s, and Disney. If a user clicked on them they were taken to the homepage of the Google Play Store, showing that they were not real ads.
Carmel said these images belonged to OutStream Media and were created as test images when the company was operational last year. He said someone used these images without permission to execute the fraud.
“The banners were ONLY used for reach media demos of outstream units,” he said in an email. “After seeing in your email that someone used our banner without our permission we removed it from our server. Thank you for pointing it out.”
Ultimately what Carmel claims is that an unknown bad actor created an account on his platform, and then used banner ad images created by his subsidiary to execute the fraud scheme. He declined to share information about the bad actor’s account, citing legal concerns. He also couldn’t say exactly how this actor knew about banner ads uploaded to the account of OutStream Media — a company Carmel says was only briefly operational last year. He suggested one of the organizations OutStream had previously tried to pitch its services to was involved.
“The demo page of Outstream units was public and as well have been sent to many potential customers (BTW, one of them was Buzzfeed),” he said in an email. Carmel did not provide contact information for the person at BuzzFeed he says received the OutStream pitch. He did provide screenshots of email templates that were sent to prospective clients in May of last year that included a link to a demo.
Carmel says the same bad actor must have copied the OutStream tracking code that included shoval.tv, the domain owned by Melenboim. This means the fraudsters were sophisticated enough to set up and manage the scheme, but would have left in a tracking pixel that prevents them from receiving performance data on their ads.
Greiner of Protected Media said several ad tech companies engaged in or facilitated this form of fraud. Aniview was the one they gathered the most convincing evidence about. Others continue to run the scheme after being contacted by Protected Media, and in at least one case an executive from an involved company even complained about being called out.
“One of them spoke to my VP of sales and said everybody does it, why are we picking on them,” Greiner said. “It’s something we hear too often, unfortunately.” ●
For nearly a decade, we’ve been in discussions with the European Commission about the way some of our products work. Throughout this process, we’ve always agreed on one thing一that healthy, thriving… Article word count: 372
For nearly a decade, we’ve been in discussions with the European Commission about the way some of our products work. Throughout this process, we’ve always agreed on one thing一that healthy, thriving… Article word count: 372
For nearly a decade, we’ve been in discussions with the European Commission about the way some of our products work. Throughout this process, we’ve always agreed on one thing一that healthy, thriving markets are in everyone’s interest.
A key characteristic of open and competitive markets一and of Google’s products一is constant change. Every year, we make thousands of changes to our products, spurred by feedback from our partners and our users. Over the last few years, we’ve also made changes一to Google Shopping; to our mobile apps licenses; and to AdSense for Search一in direct response to formal concerns raised by the European Commission.
Since then, we’ve been listening carefully to the feedback we’re getting, both from the European Commission, and from others. As a result, over the next few months, we’ll be making further updates to our products in Europe.
Since 2017, when we adapted Google Shopping to comply with the Commission’s order, we’ve made a number of changes to respond to feedback. Recently, we’ve started testing a new format that gives direct links to comparison shopping sites, alongside specific product offers from merchants.
On Android phones, you’ve always been able to install any search engine or browser you want, irrespective of what came pre-installed on the phone when you bought it. In fact, a typical Android phone user will usually install around 50 additional apps on their phone.
After the Commission’s July 2018 decision, we changed the licensing model for the Google apps we build for use on Android phones, creating new, separate licenses for Google Play, the Google Chrome browser, and for Google Search. In doing so, we maintained the freedom for phone makers to install any alternative app alongside a Google app.
Now we’ll also do more to ensure that Android phone owners know about the wide choice of browsers and search engines available to download to their phones. This will involve asking users of existing and new Android devices in Europe which browser and search apps they would like to use.
We’ve always tried to give people the best and fastest answers一whether direct from Google, or from the wide range of specialist websites and app providers out there today. These latest changes demonstrate our continued commitment to operating in an open and principled way.
For nearly a decade, we’ve been in discussions with the European Commission about the way some of our products work. Throughout this process, we’ve always agreed on one thing一that healthy, thriving markets are in everyone’s interest. A key characteristic of open and competitive markets一and of Google’s products一is constant change. Every year, we make thousands of changes to our products, spurred by feedback from our partners and our users. Over the last few years, we’ve also made changes一to Google Shopping; to our mobile apps licenses; and to AdSense for Search一in direct response to formal concerns raised by the European Commission. Since then, we’ve been listening carefully to the feedback we’re getting, both from the European Commission, and from others. As a result, over the next few months, we’ll be making further updates to our products in Europe.Since 2017, when we adapted Google Shopping to comply with the Commission’s order, we’ve made a number of changes to respond to feedback. Recently, we’ve started testing a new format that gives direct links to comparison shopping sites, alongside specific product offers from merchants. On Android phones, you’ve always been able to install any search engine or browser you want, irrespective of what came pre-installed on the phone when you bought it. In fact, a typical Android phone user will usually install around 50 additional apps on their phone.After the Commission’s July 2018 decision, we changed the licensing model for the Google apps we build for use on Android phones, creating new, separate licenses for Google Play, the Google Chrome browser, and for Google Search. In doing so, we maintained the freedom for phone makers to install any alternative app alongside a Google app. Now we’ll also do more to ensure that Android phone owners know about the wide choice of browsers and search engines available to download to their phones. This will involve asking users of existing and new Android devices in Europe which browser and search apps they would like to use. We’ve always tried to give people the best and fastest answers一whether direct from Google, or from the wide range of specialist websites and app providers out there today. These latest changes demonstrate our continued commitment to operating in an open and principled way.